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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1738 
_____________ 
 
KATHY REILLY, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated; PATRICIA PLUEMACHER, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CERIDIAN CORPORATION 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-05142) 
District Judge: Hon. Jose L. Linares 
 
__________ 
 
Argued October 27, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, 
Circuit Judges. 
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(Filed  December 12, 2011) 
 
Alan S. Pralgever, Esq. (Argued) 
Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP 
75 Livingston Avenue, Suite 301 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Steven J. Wells, Esq.(Argued) 
Bryan C. Keane, Esq. 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500 
Minneapolis, MN 55402 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Kathy Reilly and Patricia Pluemacher, individually and 
on behalf of all others similarly situated, appeal from an order 
of the United States District Court for the District of New  
Jersey, which granted Ceridian Corporation‟s motion to dis-
miss for lack of standing, and alternatively, failure to state a 
claim. Appellants contend that (1) they have standing to bring 
their claims in federal court, and (2) they stated a claim that 
adequately alleged cognizable damage, injury, and ascertain-
able loss. We hold that Appellants lack standing and do not 
reach the merits of the substantive issue. We will therefore 
affirm. 
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I. 
A. 
Ceridian is a payroll processing firm with its principal 
place of business in Bloomington, Minnesota. To process its 
commercial business customers‟ payrolls, Ceridian collects 
information about its customers‟ employees. This information 
may include employees‟ names, addresses, social security 
numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information.   
Reilly and Pluemacher were employees of the Brach 
Eichler law firm, a Ceridian customer, until September 2003. 
Ceridian entered into contracts with Appellants‟ employer 
and the employers of the proposed class members to provide 
payroll processing services. 
 
On or about December 22, 2009, Ceridian suffered a 
security breach. An unknown hacker infiltrated Ceridian‟s 
Powerpay system and potentially gained access to personal 
and financial information belonging to Appellants and ap-
proximately 27,000 employees at 1,900 companies. It is not 
known whether the hacker read, copied, or understood the  
data. 
 
Working with law enforcement and professional inves-
tigators, Ceridian determined what information the hacker 
may have accessed. On about January 29, 2010, Ceridian sent 
letters to the potential identity theft victims, informing them 
of the breach: “[S]ome of your personal information . . . may 
have been illegally accessed by an unauthorized hacker . . . . 
[T]he information accessed included your first name, last 
name, social security number and, in several cases, birth date 
and/or the bank account that is used for direct deposit.” App. 
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00039. Ceridian arranged to provide the potentially affected 
individuals with one year of free credit monitoring and identi-
ty theft protection. Individuals had until April 30, 2010, to 
enroll in the free program, and Ceridian included instructions 
on how to do so within its letter.   
 
B. 
 
On October 7, 2010, Appellants filed a complaint 
against Ceridian, on behalf of themselves and all others simi-
larly situated, in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey.
1
 Appellants alleged that they: (1) have an 
increased risk of identity theft, (2) incurred costs to monitor 
their credit activity, and (3) suffered from emotional distress.  
 
On December 15, 2010, Ceridian filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of standing and failure to 
state a claim. On February 22, 2011, the District Court 
granted Ceridian‟s motion, holding that Appellants lacked  
Article III standing. The Court further held that, assuming 
Appellants had standing, they nonetheless failed to  
adequately allege the damage, injury, and ascertainable loss 
elements of their claims. Appellants timely filed their Notice 
of Appeal on March 18, 2011. 
 
                                              
1
 Appellants‟ proposed class consists of all persons whose 
personal and financial information was contained in the  
Ceridian Powerpay System and was stolen or otherwise mis-
placed as a result of the breach. 
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II. 
 
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s  
final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But “[a]bsent 
Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff‟s claims, and they must 
be dismissed.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 
F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). Hence, we exercise plenary  
review over the District Court‟s jurisdictional determinations, 
see Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 294 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2007), “review[ing] only whether the allegations on the 
face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the district court,” Common Cause 
of Penn. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We also review de novo a district court‟s grant of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See 
Vallies v. Sky Bank, 432 F.3d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 2006).  
 
Because the District Court dismissed Appellants‟ 
claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), we accept as 
true all well-pleaded allegations and construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Lewis 
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 542 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
III. 
 
Appellants‟ allegations of hypothetical, future injury 
do not establish standing under Article III. For the following 
reasons we will therefore affirm the District Court‟s  
dismissal. 
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A. 
 
Article III limits our jurisdiction to actual “cases or 
controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. One element of this 
“bedrock requirement” is that plaintiffs “must establish that 
they have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997). It is the plaintiffs‟ burden, at the pleading stage, to 
establish standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant 
Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003).  Although “general 
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant‟s 
conduct may suffice,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, the complaint 
must still “clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to 
satisfy” Article III. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990).  
 
 “[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Standing implicates both constitutional 
and prudential limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
See Storino, 322 F.3d at 296. Constitutional standing requires 
an “injury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Danvers Motor 
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290-291 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561). An injury-in-fact “must 
be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense. The 
complainant must allege an injury to himself that is „distinct 
and palpable,‟ as distinguished from merely „abstract,‟ and 
the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not „conjectur-
al‟ or „hypothetical.‟” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (internal 
citations omitted). 
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 Allegations of “possible future injury” are not  
sufficient to satisfy Article III. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158; 
see  also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (stating that allegations of 
a future harm at some indefinite time cannot be an “actual or 
imminent injury”). Instead, “[a] threatened injury must be 
„certainly impending,‟” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 (internal 
citation omitted), and “proceed with a high degree of  
immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case 
in which no injury would have occurred at all,” Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 564 n.2; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 122 (explaining that 
the imminence requirement “ensures that courts do not  
entertain suits based on speculative or hypothetical harms”). 
A plaintiff therefore lacks standing if his “injury” stems from 
an indefinite risk of future harms inflicted by unknown third 
parties.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. 
 
B. 
 
We conclude that Appellants‟ allegations of hypotheti-
cal, future injury are insufficient to establish standing. Appel-
lants‟ contentions rely on speculation that the hacker: (1) 
read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) 
intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the infor-
mation; and (3) is able to use such information to the detri-
ment of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in 
Appellants‟ names. Unless and until these conjectures come 
true, Appellants have not suffered any injury; there has been 
no misuse of the information, and thus, no harm. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently dismissed cases 
for lack of standing when the alleged future harm is neither 
imminent nor certainly impending.  For example, the Lujan 
  8 
Court addressed whether plaintiffs had standing when seeking 
to enjoin the funding of activities that threatened certain  
species‟ habitats. The Court held that plaintiffs‟ claim that 
they would visit the project sites “some day” did not meet the 
requirement that their injury be “imminent.” 504 U.S. at 564 
n.2 (“[W]e are at a loss to see how, as a factual matter, the 
standard can be met by respondents‟ mere profession of an 
intent, some day, to return.”).  Appellants‟ allegations here 
are even more speculative than those at issue in Lujan. There, 
the acts necessary to make the injury “imminent” were within 
plaintiffs‟ own control, because all plaintiffs needed to do 
was travel to the site to see the alleged destruction of wildlife 
take place. Yet, notwithstanding their stated intent to travel to 
the site at some point in the future—which the Court had no 
reason to doubt—their harm was not imminent enough to 
confer standing. See id. Here, Appellants‟ alleged increased 
risk of future injury is even more attenuated, because it is  
dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an un-
known third-party.  
 
The requirement that an injury be “certainly impend-
ing” is best illustrated by City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95 (1983). There, the Court held that a plaintiff lacked 
standing to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department from 
using a controversial chokehold technique on arrestees. See 
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-106. Although the plaintiff had  
already once been subjected to this maneuver, the future harm 
he sought to enjoin depended on the police again arresting 
and choking him. See id. at 105. Unlike the plaintiff in Lyons, 
Appellants in this case have yet to suffer any harm, and their 
alleged increased risk of future injury is nothing more than 
speculation. As such, the alleged injury is not “certainly  
impending.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2. 
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Our Court, too, has refused to confer standing when 
plaintiffs fail to allege an imminent injury-in-fact. For  
example, although the plaintiffs in Storino contended that a 
municipal ordinance would eventually result in a commercial-
ly undesirable zoning change, we held that the allegation of 
future economic damage was too conjectural and insufficient 
to meet the “injury in fact” requirement. See 322 F.3d at 298. 
As we stated in that case, “one cannot describe how the 
[plaintiffs] will be injured without beginning the explanation 
with the word „if.‟ The prospective damages, described by the 
[plaintiffs] as certain, are, in reality, conjectural.” Id. at 297-
298. Similarly, we cannot now describe how Appellants will 
be injured in this case without beginning our explanation with 
the word “if”: if the hacker read, copied, and understood the 
hacked information, and if the hacker attempts to use the  
information, and if he does so successfully, only then will 
Appellants have suffered an injury.  
 
C. 
 
In this increasingly digitized world, a number of courts 
have had occasion to decide whether the “risk of future harm” 
posed by data security breaches confers standing on persons 
whose information may have been accessed. Most courts have 
held that such plaintiffs lack standing because the harm is too 
speculative. See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. 
Supp. 2d 1046, 1051-1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009); see also Key v. 
DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006). We 
agree with the holdings in those cases. Here, no evidence 
suggests that the data has been—or will ever be—misused. 
The present test is actuality, not hypothetical speculations 
concerning the possibility of future injury. Appellants‟ allega-
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tions of an increased risk of identity theft resulting from a  
security breach are therefore insufficient to secure standing. 
See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 (“[A]llegations of possible 
future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III.”). 
 
Principally relying on Pisciotta v. Old National  
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007), Appellants contend 
that an increased risk of identity theft is itself a harm  
sufficient to confer standing. In Pisciotta, plaintiffs brought a 
class action against a bank after its website had been hacked, 
alleging that the bank failed to adequately secure the personal 
information it solicited (such as names, addresses, birthdates, 
and social security numbers) when consumers applied for 
banking services on its website. The named plaintiffs did not 
allege “any completed direct financial loss to their accounts” 
nor that they “already had been the victim of identity theft as 
a result of the breach.” Id. at 632. The court, nonetheless, held 
that plaintiffs had standing, concluding, without explanation, 
that the “injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a 
threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff 
only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff 
would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant‟s actions.” 
Id. at 634. 
 
Appellants rely as well on Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 
628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), in which the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit conferred standing under circumstances 
much different from those present here. There, plaintiffs‟ 
“names, addresses, and social security numbers were stored 
on a laptop that was stolen from Starbucks.” Id. at 1140. The 
court concluded that plaintiffs met the standing requirement 
through their allegations of “a credible threat of real and  
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop contain-
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ing their unencrypted personal data.” Id. at 1143.  Appellants 
here contend that we should follow Pisciotta and Krottner and 
hold that the “credible threat of real and immediate harm” 
stemming from the security breach of Ceridian‟s Powerpay 
system satisfies the standing requirement. Id. 
 
But these cases have little persuasive value here; in 
Pisciotta and Krottner, the threatened harms were  
significantly more “imminent” and “certainly impending” 
than the alleged harm here. In Pisciotta, there was evidence 
that “the [hacker‟s] intrusion was sophisticated, intentional 
and malicious.” 499 F.3d at 632. In Krottner, someone  
attempted to open a bank account with a plaintiff‟s informa-
tion following the physical theft of the laptop.
2
 See 628 F.3d 
at 1142. Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was  
intentional or malicious. Appellants have alleged no misuse, 
and therefore, no injury. Indeed, no identifiable taking  
occurred; all that is known is that a firewall was penetrated. 
Appellants‟ string of hypothetical injuries do not meet the  
requirement of an “actual or imminent” injury.  
 
D. 
 
Neither Pisciotta nor Krottner, moreover, discussed the 
constitutional standing requirements and how they apply to 
generalized data theft situations. Indeed, the Pisciotta court 
did not mention—let alone discuss—the requirement that a 
threatened injury must be “imminent” and “certainly impend-
ing” to confer standing. See 499 F.3d at 634. Instead of  
making a determination as to whether the alleged injury was 
                                              
2
 The bank closed the account before any financial loss oc-
curred. 
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“certainly impending,” both courts simply analogized data-
security-breach situations to defective-medical-device, toxic-
substance-exposure, or environmental-injury cases. See id.; 
see also Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142-1143.   
 
Still, Appellants urge us to adopt those courts‟ skimpy 
rationale for three reasons. First, Appellants here expended 
monies on credit monitoring and insurance to protect their 
safety, just as plaintiffs in defective-medical-device and  
toxic-substance-exposure cases expend monies on medical 
monitoring. See Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 
568, 570-575 (6th Cir. 2005). Second, members of this  
putative class may very well have suffered emotional distress 
from the incident, which also represents a bodily injury, just 
as plaintiffs in the medical-device and toxic-tort cases have 
suffered physical injuries. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Li-
tig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that “courts 
have begun to recognize claims like medical monitoring, 
which can allow plaintiffs some relief even absent present 
manifestations of physical injury” and that “in the toxic tort 
context, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for  
emotional distress suffered because of the fear of contracting 
a toxic exposure disease”). Third, injury to one‟s identity is 
extraordinarily unique and money may not even compensate 
one for the injuries sustained, just as environmental injury is 
unique and monetary compensation may not adequately  
return plaintiffs to their original position. See Cent. Delta Wa-
ter Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that “monetary compensation may well not 
adequately return plaintiffs to their original position” because 
harms to the environment “are frequently difficult or imposs-
ible to remedy”). Based on these analogies, Appellants  
contend they have established standing here. These analogies 
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do not persuade us, because defective-medical-device and 
toxic-substance-exposure cases confer standing based on two 
important factors not present in data breach cases.   
 
First, in those cases, an injury has undoubtedly  
occurred. In medical-device cases, a defective device has 
been implanted into the human body with a quantifiable risk 
of failure. See Sutton, 419 F.3d at 574. Similarly, exposure to 
a toxic substance causes injury; cells are damaged and a  
disease mechanism has been introduced. See In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d at 851, 851-852 (explaining that 
“persons exposed to toxic chemicals emanating from the 
landfill have an increased risk of invisible genetic damage 
and a present cause of action for their injury” because “in a 
toxic age, significant harm can be done to an individual by a 
tortfeasor, notwithstanding latent manifestation of that 
harm”). Hence, the damage has been done; we just cannot yet 
quantify how it will manifest itself.  
 
In data breach cases where no misuse is alleged,  
however, there has been no injury—indeed, no change in the 
status quo. Here, Appellants‟ credit card statements are  
exactly the same today as they would have been had  
Ceridian‟s database never been hacked. Moreover, there is no 
quantifiable risk of damage in the future. See id. at 852 (“As a 
proximate result of exposure [to the toxic substance], plaintiff 
suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease.”). Any damages that may occur here are  
entirely speculative and dependent on the skill and intent of 
the hacker. 
 
Second, standing in medical-device and toxic-tort  
cases hinges on human health concerns.  See Sutton, 419 F.3d 
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at 575.  Courts resist strictly applying the “actual injury” test 
when the future harm involves human suffering or premature 
death.  See id. As the Sutton court explained, “there is  
something to be said for disease prevention, as opposed to 
disease treatment. Waiting for a plaintiff to suffer physical 
injury before allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly 
harsh and economically inefficient.” Id. The deceased, after 
all, have little use for compensation. This case implicates 
none of these concerns.  The hacker did not change or injure 
Appellants‟ bodies; any harm that may occur—if all of  
Appellants‟ stated fears are actually realized—may be re-
dressed in due time through money damages after the harm 
occurs with no fear that litigants will be dead or disabled from 
the onset of the injury. See Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 690 
(“[T]hose [medical monitoring] cases not only act as a narrow 
exception to the general rule of courts rejecting standing 
based on increased risk of future harm, but are also factually 
distinguishable from the present case [of a data security 
breach].”).  
  
An analogy to environmental injury cases fails as well. 
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in 
Central Delta Water Agency, standing is unique in the  
environmental context because monetary compensation may 
not adequately return plaintiffs to their original position. See 
id. at 950 (“The extinction of a species, the destruction of a 
wilderness habitat, or the fouling of air and water are harms 
that are frequently difficult or impossible to remedy [by  
monetary compensation].”). In a data breach case, however, 
there is no reason to believe that monetary compensation will 
not return plaintiffs to their original position completely—if 
the hacked information is actually read, copied, understood, 
and misused to a plaintiff‟s detriment. To the contrary, unlike 
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priceless “mountains majesty,” the thing feared lost here is 
simple cash, which is easily and precisely compensable with a 
monetary award. We therefore decline to analogize this case 
to those cases in the medical device, toxic tort or environmen-
tal injury contexts.  
 
E. 
 
Finally, we conclude that Appellants‟ alleged time and 
money expenditures to monitor their financial information do 
not establish standing, because costs incurred to watch for a 
speculative chain of future events based on hypothetical  
future criminal acts are no more “actual” injuries than the  
alleged “increased risk of injury” which forms the basis for 
Appellants‟ claims. See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity 
Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he „lost data‟ 
cases . . . clearly reject the theory that a plaintiff is entitled to 
reimbursement for credit monitoring services or for time and 
money spent monitoring his or her credit.”). That a plaintiff 
has willingly incurred costs to protect against an alleged  
increased risk of identity theft is not enough to demonstrate a 
“concrete and particularized” or “actual or imminent” injury. 
Id.; see also Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (holding 
plaintiff lacked standing even though he allegedly spent time 
and money to protect himself from risk of future injury); 
Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08-6060, 2010 
WL 2643307, at *4, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (noting that 
plaintiffs‟ “out-of-pocket expenses incurred to proactively 
safeguard and/or repair their credit” and the “expense of 
comprehensive credit monitoring” did not confer standing); 
Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *5 
n.7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (rejecting claims for time and 
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money spent on credit monitoring due to a perceived risk of 
harm as the basis for an injury in fact). 
 
Although Appellants have incurred expenses to moni-
tor their accounts and “to protect their personal and financial 
information from imminent misuse and/or identity theft,” 
App. 00021, they have not done so as a result of any actual 
injury (e.g. because their private information was misused or 
their identities stolen). Rather, they prophylactically spent 
money to ease fears of future third-party criminality. Such 
misuse is only speculative—not imminent. The claim that 
they incurred expenses in anticipation of future harm,  
therefore, is not sufficient to confer standing. 
 
IV. 
 
The District Court correctly held that Appellants failed 
to plead specific facts demonstrating they have standing to 
bring this suit under Article III, because Appellants‟  
allegations of an increased risk of identity theft as a result of 
the security breach are hypothetical, future injuries, and are 
therefore insufficient to establish standing. For the reasons set 
forth, we will AFFIRM the District Court‟s order granting 
Ceridian‟s motion to dismiss. 
 
